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SUBSEQUENT USE OF CIVIL ADJUDICATIONS
OF OBSCENITY
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, states have added a new weapon to their existing
arsenal for use in their fight against obscenity. This weapon is legis-
lation which establishes procedures for the civil adjudication of alleg-
edly obscene material prior to, or apart from, a criminal prosecution.'
Generally, the statutes provide that a prosecutor, 2 at his own option,8
may institute an action against material that he has reasonable cause
1. See, e.g., Az.A. CODE tit. 14, § 374(5)-(13) (Supp. 1973); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:106F (West 1974); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§ 28C-28I, 30 (West Supp.
1977-1978); N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAw § 6330 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.2 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1040.14-.22 (1971); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5903(h)-(i) (Purdon 1973); VT. STAT. AN. tit. 13, §§ 2809-2813 (Supp.
1977).
Massachusetts is a jurisdiction with a bifurcated injunction procedure. MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. Ch. 272, §§ 28C-281, 30 (West Supp. 1977-1978). It authorizes procedures
for equitable actions to determine the question of obscenity as it relates only to books.
Section 281 makes the procedure a condition precedent, as to books only, to the institu-
tion of any criminal proceeding for the dissemination or possession of obscene matter.
Section 30 injunctive procedures apply to all other types of obscene material. See, Dist-
rict Attorney v. Three Way Theatres Corp., 357 N.E.2d 747 (Mass. 1976).
2. A prosecutor may be the attorney general, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272,
§ 28C (West Supp. 1977-1978); OxrA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.14 (1971); a district attor-
ney, ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(5) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 6330 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1976-1977); any law enforcement officer, Id.; any prosecuting officer, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2810 (Supp. 1977).
3. A prosecutor may institute an equitable action to enjoin the sale of allegedly
obscene matter at his discretion prior to, or in lieu of, a criminal prosecution. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(5) (Supp. 1973) (all material, except mailable matter); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 30 (West Supp. 1977-78) (all matter, except books); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6330.1 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977) (only material that is allegedly
obscene to persons under the age of seventeen); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.14 (1971);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h) (Purdon 1973).
Some jurisdictions however, have made a prior civil determination of obscenity
mandatory before a criminal prosecution may be initiated: See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit.
14, § 374(16K)(C) (Supp. 1973) (mailable matter); IA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:106F
(1) (West 1974) (compulsory for all material except "hard core" pornography); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 28C (West Supp. 1977-1978) (required for all obscene
books); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(a) (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2809
(Supp. 1977) (mandatory for written matter in a book under the juvenile statutes; the
state has repealed its adult obscenity legislation).
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to believe is obscene.4 Under the typical statutory scheme, the prose-
cutor files a petition: (1) naming the publication; (2) naming certain
parties as defendants such as the author, the publisher, and the whole-
sale and retail distributors; (3) seeking an adjudication that the ma-
terial is obscene; and (4) seeking a permanent injunction against the
further sale or dissemination of the material, if it is found to be ob-
scene. The court then summarily examines the material to determine
if there is probable cause to find the material obscene. If there is not,
the court will dismiss the petition. If there is however, the court will
issue an order to the named parties to show cause why the material
should not be adjudged obscene. Contemporaneous with the issuance
of this order, the court may order an injunction pendente lite5 against
the further sale and distribution of the material, if the statute so pro-
vides.6 The named respondents, or any interested parties, may appear
and file an answer. A trial on the issue of obscenity is conducted
in accordance with the rules of civil procedure applicable to the trial
of cases by a court with or without a jury. If the material is adjudged
obscene, the court orders the surrender and the destruction of the ma-
terial and issues a permanent injunction against any person who sells
or distributes the material. Other statutory provisions make it a crime,
punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both, to sell or distribute material
that has been judicially determined obscene.
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(3) (Supp. 1973) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§1040.12 (1971) (statutory definitions of matter or material). The Alabama definition
includes, "[A]ny book, pamphlet, magazine, periodical, newspaper, picture magazine,
comic book, story book, or other printed or written matter, but does not include written
or printed matter or material used by or in any religious, scientific, or educational insti-
tution." MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 272, § 28C (West Supp. 1977-1978) and VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2809 (Supp. 1977) (equitable actions for written material in
a book only); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:106A(3) (West 1974) (any tangible material);
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6330.1 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
190.2(a) (Supp. 1975); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h) (Purdon 1973) (allow injunctions
against any allegedly obscene book, magazine, motion picture, or other material).
5. An injunction pendente lite is a temporary injunction granted, pending trial
upon the merits, for the purpose of preventing any acts which may harm the rights
of parties to the controversy, or for the purpose of preserving the subject matter of the
controversy. Ford v. Taylor, 140 F. 356, 358 (C.C.D. Nev. 1905).
6. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(7) (Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 272, § 30 (West Supp. 1977-1978); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 6330.6 (McKinney Supp.
1976-1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(d)(3) (Supp. 1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5903(h) (Purdon 1973).
7. Some states provide for trial by the court. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(9)
(Supp. 1973), LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14: 106F(2) (West 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-190.2(d) (Supp. 1975); OYLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.18 (1971). Other states require
trial by jury. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 272, § 28D (West Supp. 1977-1978);
1 PA. Cons. STAT. ANN. § 5903(i) (Purdon -1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2811
(Supp. 1971) (which requires a unanimous verdict).
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Although the use of civil sanctions to control the dissemination of
obscene material is not a new phenomenon,8 the recent enactment of
legislation which provides for equitable proceedings to control obscen-
ity evidences a growing trend whereby prosecutors may resort to civil
forums to litigate the issue of obscenity prior to, or in lieu of, criminal
prosecutions. The purpose of this comment is to explore some of the
substantial constitutional problems that may arise in the course of such
a civil proceeding and in a subsequent action where the question of
obscenity is sought to be precluded by a prior determination.
Section I examines the advantages and disadvantages of an equit-
able action and summarizes the existing framework of constitutional
standards and procedures which must be present when there is an ad-
judication of the obscenity issue. Section II considers whether the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that a defendant
have a right to a jury finding that the material is obscene beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, in a state civil proceeding. Section 1H focuses on the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to determine what effect, if any, a prior
civil judgment on the issue of obscenity will have in a subsequent ac-
tion. Section III also considers several equal protection and due pro-
cess problems which are raised by allowing an issue decided in a civil
action to be conclusive as to an element of the crime charged.
Primarily, this comment analyzes under what circumstances the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable to multiple actions involving
the same allegedly obscene material and/or parties, and the implica-
tions of such a rule.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS IN THE
ADJUDICATION OF OBSCENITY
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. In light of this
proposition, the Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton'° ac-
8. See, e.g., Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). In
that 1961 case, the Supreme Court concluded that a Chicago ordinance, requiring the
submission of films for examination or censorship prior to their public exhibition, was
valid on its face.
9. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
10. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The Respondent had brought an action in a lower state
court to enjoin the petitioner from showing allegedly obscene motion pictures. The
state supreme court reversed the trial court's refusal to issue an injunction and the peti-
tioners appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger concluded
that nothing precluded a state from regulating allegedly obscene material, although it
[Vol. 13:146
3
Schmidt: Subsequent Use of Civil Adjudications of Obscenity
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
OBSCENITY ADJUDICATIONS
knowledged that: "States have a legitimate interest in regulating com-
merce in obscene material and in regulating exhibition of obscene ma-
terial in places of public accommodation. . .. ""
Because it is within a state's inherent police power to protect so-
ciety's interest in morality,"2 states have been allowed considerable lati-
tude in choosing among constitutionally permissible means to control
obscenity. In Kingsley Books v. Brown,' 3 it was recognized that it was
not within the Court's prerogative to prescribe limits on the legislature's
selection of remedies. If the means are legitimate, the states can exer-
cise their own discretion in deciding whether prohibited conduct should
be punished by a criminal prosecution or a civil sanction.' 4
Not only has the Supreme Court upheld the validity of civil sanc-
tions, but some members of the Court have expressed a preference for
them as an alternative to complete reliance on criminal prosecutions
for the regulation of obscenity. Justice Frankfurter, in Kingsley, ar-
gued that states should use equitable proceedings as "a brake on the
temptation to exploit a filthy business offered by the limited hazards
of piecemeal prosecutions, sale by sale, of a publication."'I5 From an-
other perspective, Justice Douglas proposed that there should be a civil
determination on the issue of the obscenity of a given publication; then
a subsequent violation of the law prohibiting the sale of obscene ma-
terial would be required before any criminal prosecution could be in-
stituted against the individual. By utilizing such civil procedures, he
asserted, a state could make its vague obscenity laws more specific and
was viewed only by "consenting adults", as long as the applicable state law complied
with the first amendment standards enunciated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
23-25 (1973).
11. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973).
12. Id. at 61.
13. 354 U.S. 436 (1957). The majority opinion upheld a state procedure which
authorized an injunction against further dissemination of obscene material and an order
for its seizure and destruction upon a court finding of obscenity. Under the statute,
an ex parte, temporary injunction could be issued prior to trial on the merits, but trial
had to be within one day of joinder of issue and had to be decided within two days
of its end. The appellant challenged the temporary restraining order as a prior restraint
on speech not yet determined to be unprotected. The Court rejected this contention
and held that the injunction was not an impermissible prior restraint because of the
safeguards it provided for first amendment values.
14. Id. at 441.
15. Id. at 440. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, went on to state
that instead of requiring the bookseller to risk criminal prosecution for sale of a book
without prior warning as to the book's obscenity, the civil procedure assures that such
consequences cannot follow unless he ignores a court order specifically directed to him
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thereby give a person fair warning as to what actions might be crim-
inal.16
Furthermore, the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography ad-
vocates the enactment of legislation which would permit prosecutors to
acquire a declaratory judgment on the issue of the obscenity of certain
material, and encourage them to prosecute criminally. only conduct
which occurred after the civil determination.1 7  Some states have ac-
cepted this recommendation and have made equitable actions, prior to
criminal prosecutions, discretionary with the prosecutor.18 Other states
however, require a civil adjudication of the question of obscenity and
a violation of that civil judgment before an individual may be prose-
cuted criminally for selling or distributing obscene matter.'9
The Advantages and Disadvantages Of A Civil Determination
Of Obscenity
Civil proceedings to judicially determine obscenity vel non have
advantages and disadvantages for both parties to the litigation. Civil
sanctions may provide a prosecutor with a more effective means of con-
trolling the dissemination of certain types of material.20  They may also
allow him to join all affected parties within a given jurisdiction into a
single equitable proceeding, in lieu of piecemeal criminal prosecu-
tions.21 The use of civil proceedings however, may prove to be unsuc-
16. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. TE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE RE-
PORT 63 (1970).
18. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(5) (Supp. 1973) (all material, except mail-
able matter); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 30 (West Supp. 1977-1978) (all matter,
except books); N.Y. CIw. PRAC. LAw § 6330.1 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977) (only ma-
terial that is allegedly obscene to persons under the age of seventeen); OYCLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 1040.14 (1971); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h) (Purdon 1973).
19. See, e.g., A.A. CODE tit. 14, § 374(16k)(c) (Supp. 1973) (mailable matter);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:106F(1) (West 1974) (compulsory for all material except
"hard core" pornography); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 28C (West Supp. 1977-
1978) (required for obscene books); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(a) (Supp. 1975); VT.
STAT. ArN. tit. 13, § 2809 (Supp. 1977) (mandatory for written matter in a book under
its juvenile statutes; the state has repealed its adult obscenity legislation). See also,
Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amendment,
9 GA. L. Rav. 533, 569-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart] for a discussion of
how legislatures might effectively draft statutory procedures for dealing with obscenity
in a civil context.
20. For example, those types of materials which have a sufficient time period be-
tween production and distribution, such as books and motion pictures. Cf. Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1965) (upholding a Maryland scheme for the preview
of films).
21. See, e.g., A.A. CODE tit. 14, § 374(6) (Supp. 1973); LA. RyV. STAT. ANN. §
14:106F(1) (West 1974); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 28C (West Supp. 1977-
ISO [Vol. 13:146
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cessful in regulating "those outlets dealing with relatively fast-moving,
hard-core materials," 2 because of the time lag between discovering the
material, instituting an action, and receiving a judicial determination on
the merits.
For the defendant, civil procedures may be a judicial avenue for
receiving "fair notice" of what materials are constitutionally unpro-
tected and, therefore, subject to criminal laws, before the party engages
in prohibited conduct. In this way, such actions reduce the chilling ef-
fect of uncertainty on the distribution of marginal materials. 3 On the
other hand, civil sanctions may infringe on speech which would other-
wise be protected in a criminal action, because of the lower procedural
requirements. Moreover, under the threat and inconvenience of par-
ticipating in a civil litigation, a bookstore may choose not to carry cer-
tain materials. If a seller is subjected only to criminal prosecution, he
may decide to carry the material believing that the state can not meet
the higher standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) that the ma-
terial is obscene. The state's initiation of an equitable action may also
serve as an impermissible prior restraint on speech which has not been
determined to be obscene.24 These policy considerations are import-
ant in evaluating and resolving the constitutional problems that are
raised by using civil proceedings to regulate obscene speech.
Constitutional Standards And Procedures
There exists a dim line between protected speech and obscenity.2 5
Because there is a high value, embedded in our constitutional and poli-
tical history, placed on the preservation of first amendment rights, the
Court has mandated that states incorporate into their legislation certain
standards and procedures for adjudicating the issue of obscenity.
In Miller v. California,26 Chief Justice Burger enunciated two
1978); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 6330.1 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); N.C. GFN. STAT.
§ 14-190.2(c) (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.15 (Supp. 1976); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5903(h) (Purdon 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2810(b) (Supp. 1977).
22. Lockhart, supra note 19, at 570.
23. Id. at 569.
24. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). See also note 35 infra.
25. Protected speech is simply that speech which comes within the protection of
the first and fourteenth amendments. See Konisberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50
(1961).
26. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The appellant was convicted of mailing unsolicited sexu-
ally explicit material in violation of a state statute. The Supreme Court held that mate-
rial may be subject to state regulation provided that, taken as a whole, it appeals to
the prurient interest in sex, portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and,
1977]
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limitations on the permissible scope of state statutes regulating obscene
material. First, the legislation must be restricted to works which depict
and describe sexual conduct. Second, the prohibited conduct must be
specifically defined by applicable state law, as written or authoritatively
construed.17  In order that a state might determine what constitutes
obscene speech, he promulgated a three-part test to be used in all ob-
scenity cases, regardless of the nature of the forum, be it criminal or
civil.2 The test was stated as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether "the average person applying contemporary commun-
ity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.29
In addition to these guidelines for determining the question of ob-
scenity, certain procedural safeguards are necessary to insure that pro-
tected speech is not unduly suppressed. In McKinney v. Alabama,0
the state instituted an equitable proceeding (in rem and in personam)
to have certain material declared obscene and to enjoin certain parties
from further sales. The petitioner received notice of the judgment al-
though he was not a party to the action. Subsequently, he was charged
and convicted of selling what had been judicially determined to be ob-
scene material. During the course of the criminal trial, the judge ruled
that petitioner was precluded from relitigating the issue of the obscenity
of the material. The Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the
state courts, did not condemn civil sanctions in general, but did declare
that this procedure violated the first and the fourteenth amendments."
It concluded that because the petitioner did not have an opportunity
to litigate the question of obscenity in the prior civil action, he was not
bound by the courfs judgment. It found he must have an "opportunity
again taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The
Court vacated the conviction of the appellant and remanded.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Chief Justice Burger made no distinction between criminal and civil obscenity
actions, and referred to all state statutes designed to regulate obscene materials. See
id. at 23-24.
29. 413 U.S. at 24.
30. 424 U.S. 669 (1976).
31. Id. at 670.
[Vol. 13:146
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to litigate in some forum the issue of the obscenity of [the material]
before he may be convicted of selling obscene material. 32
In conjunction with the requirements of notice and an opportunity
to be heard, due process and freedom of speech mandate certain addi-
tional procedures in the conduct of an obscenity trial. In Freedman
v. Mayland,13 the petitioner challenged a Maryland motion picture
censorship statute as a prior restraint on free speech. Justice Brennan,
in striking down the Maryland scheme, held that the statute failed to
provide the necessary safeguards against undue inhibition of protected
expression. The Court's opinion stated that censorship procedures
can avoid constitutional infirmity only if they are carried out under cer-
tain procedural safeguards. First, the burden of proving that the
speech is unprotected expression must be borne by the state. Sec-
ond, "because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceed-
ing ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid
final restraint. '34  Finally, there must be a prompt and final judicial
decision, to minimize the chilling effect of an erroneous administrative
decision: "Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial deter-
mination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the
status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial
resolution."3 5
These procedural requirements, which are necessary in an obscen-
ity trial, evidence a philosophy that due process requires more safe-
guards than normal in a civil action when the sensitive area of free
speech is involved. For example, by placing the burden on the state
to prove that the speech is obscene, the Court has relieved the defend-
ant from having to prove that the speech is entitled to constitutional
32. Id. at 677.
33. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
34. Id. at 58.
35. Id. at 59. In light of Freedman, those statutes which authorize injunctions pen-
dente lite and which do not expressly or impliedly specify a time period within which
a trial and a final determination on the merits must be made, may be found to be
impermissible prior restraints on speech which has not been found to be unprotected.
See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h) (Purdon 1973) (no time limit prescribed).
On the other hand, those statutes which are worded similarly to the New York statute,
sustained in Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), should meet the procedural
requirements of Freedman and avoid the potentially chilling effect of prior restraints on
protected speech. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(9) (Supp. 1973); MAss. GEN.
Lws ANN. ch. 272, § 30 (West Supp. 1977-1978); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 6330.2
(McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(d)(1) (Supp. 1975).
1977]
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss1/11
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
protection. 6 Compatible with this philosophy is the possibility that
freedom of speech and due process mandate that a state civil proceed-
ing include the requirement that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the material is obscene.
T[. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF PROOF
The Right to a Jury Trial
Although Alexander v. Virginia,87 held that a jury trial was not
constitutionally required in a state civil action, brought to enjoin the
sale and distribution of allegedly obscene material, the language of the
Supreme Court in prior and subsequent cases is inconsistent with that
holding. The majority opinion in Miller supports the proposition that
the right to a jury trial is a necessary element of an obscenity case,
whether it be a civil or criminal one. Miller emphasized that, in resolv-
ing the "inevitably sensitive" question of whether certain material is ob-
scene, states should continue to rely on the jury system, accompanied
by other judicial protections.88
Likewise, in the companion cases of Hamling v. United States0
and Jenkins v. Georgia,40 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court,
explained the constitutional parameters of jury discretion in an obscen-
ity trial. He held that when applying the "contemporary community
standard" of the Miller test, "[a] juror is entitled to draw on his own
knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or
vicinage from which he comes for making the required determina-
tion."' 9)
36. Which party has the burden of proof may be important. Where there is equal
evidence on both sides, the party with the burden of proof will fail. In an obscenity
case, the Court has placed the burden on the censor. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51, 58 (1965).
37. 413 U.S. 836 (1973) (per curiam).
38. 413 U.S. at 26.
39. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The Court affirmed the conviction of the petitioners for
mailing obscene materials in violation of federal law. Justice Rehnquist held that the
relevant "contemporary community" standard of the Miller test in a federal obscenity
case was the federal judicial district from which the jury is drawn.
40. 418 U.S. 153 (1974). In this companion case to Hamling, Justice Rehnquist
refused to require states to apply a statewide "contemporary community" standard, under
the Miller test, in state obscenity prosecutions. Rather, he found that it was permissible
for states to use either a statewide or a local judicial district standard. He went on
to find, however, that the trial court had improperly applied the Miller test and that
the appellant's conviction must be reversed, as the material he distributed was not ob,
scene as a matter of law.
41. 418 U.S. at 104.
[Vol. 13:146
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There are also strong policy considerations for requiring a jury
trial. The importance of a jury in an obscenity case has been analyzed
in the following way:
The jury represents a cross-section of the community
and has a special aptitude for reflecting the view of the aver-
age person. Jury trial of obscenity therefore provides a
peculiarly competent application of the standard for judging
obscenity which, by its definition, calls for an appraisal of
material according to the average person's application of
contemporary community standards. A statute which does
not afford the defendant, of right, a jury determination of
obscenity falls short, in my view, of giving proper effect to
the standard fashioned as the necessary safeguard demanded
by the freedoms of speech and press for material which is not
obscene.42
Additionally, Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Times Film Corporation
v. City of Chicago,4" asserted that "[tihe inexistence of a jury to deter-
mine contemporary community standards is a vital flaw. ' 44  Warren
also asserted the proposition that a jury, although it may be ill equipped
to decide on the nature of unprotected speech, does "represent the gen-
eral views and the common sense of the community and often appre-
ciate[s] the motives of the speaker or writer whose punishment is
sought. 4
5
In addition to being a representative cross section of the commu-
nity, a jury of peers may be more cognizant of and more sensitive to
free speech values. They may attempt to exercise greater precision
in delineating between the area of protected speech and obscenity than
would the judiciary. In Duncan v. Louisiana,46 ruling that a right to
a jury trial in criminal cases was guaranteed by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment,47 the court acknowledged that, "[p]ro-
viding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave
him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prose-
cutor and against the complaint, biased, or eccentric judge.148
The same logic and justifications for requiring a jury trial in a
42. Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 448 (1957) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. 365 U.S. 43, 50 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 68-69.
45. 365 U.S. at 69 n.9 (citing from Z. CHA=, FREE SPEncCH T Tm UNrmD STATES
314 (1961)).
46. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
47. Id. at 149.
48. Id. at 156.
1977]
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criminal action,49 to insure that an individual is not deprived of life or
liberty without due process, seem applicable to a civil trial involving
a question of protected speech or obscenity. The citizenry and the
Court should be reluctant to entrust the job of censorship of speech
to a select judiciary. Rather, a jury should decide for itself what the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find appealing to the prurient interest or patently offensive. Such a
conclusion is consistent with the profound commitment to the preserva-
tion of free speech. States should not be allowed the discretion of
deciding whether or not to provide jury trials.50
The Standard of Proof: Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Typically, statutes which authorize a civil adjudication of obscenity
provide that the trial is to be conducted in accordance with the estab-
lished rules of civil procedure. These rules usually designate that the
standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence.r1 When
this standard of proof is applied to the question of obscenity, the trier
of fact, in applying the Miller test, is required to find that it is more
probable than not that this material is obscene.5 2
The use of a preponderance standard of proof, which is quantita-
tively lower than a finding of beyond a reasonable doubt, may subject
material to censorship which would otherwise be entitled to constitu-
tional safekeeping. There is a margin of error that is inherently pre-
sent in the factfinding process. When one party to the litigation has
49. The Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), found that a jury trial
was essential to prevent miscarriages of justice, to insure that all defendants receive a
fair trial, and to guard against abuses of official power by a judge or group of judges.
See id. at 156-58.
50. Some states, by statute, require a jury trial in the civil proceeding. See note
7 supra.
51. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.18 (a) (1971) (civil obscenity trials to
be conducted in accordance with the rules of civil procedure). The standard of proof
in Oklahoma civil trials is the preponderance of the evidence. See, Gilbaugh v. Rose,
205 Okla. 508, 239 P.2d 406, 407-08 (1951); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h)
(Purdon 1973) (rules of civil procedure applicable). The Pennsylvania rule is the pre-
ponderance standard. See, Rasner v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 140 Pa. Super.
1124, 13 A.2d 118 (1940); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2810(c) (Supp. 1977) (rules of
civil procedure apply to civil adjudications of obscenity). Vermont standard of proof
in civil adjudications is a preponderance of the evidence. See, Gentes v. St. Peter, 105
Vt. 103, 163 A. 569 (1933).
52. The preponderance of the evidence standard requires that the trier of fact find
that the fact asserted by the party with the burden of proof is more probably true than
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at stake an "interest of transcending value," such as free speech, this
possibility of error is reduced by placing on the opposing party the
burden of convincing the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt that his
assertion is correct 3
Accepting this proposition, Justice Harlan, concurring in in re
Winship,54 recognized that a factual error can affect the outcome of the
litigation in one of two ways. First, a judgment may be rendered in
favor of the plaintiff when the true facts warrant a judgment for the
defendant. The analogue in an obscenity case would be the suppres-
sion of protected speech.55 Conversely, an erroneous factual deter-
mination can result in a decision for the defendant when the truth
would justify a decision for the plaintiff. The obscenity case analogue
would be the protection of obscene speech.
The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of these
two types of erroneous outcomes. In an obscenity trial, if the standard
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, there is a smaller risk of erroneously protecting obscene
speech, but a greater risk of mistakenly suppressing free speech.
Therefore, the social disutility of each type of factual error should be
assessed prior to a decision as to the standard of proof to be utilized
in a particular type of litigation.50 In Winship, Justice Harlan evalu-
ated the social disutility of a factual error in the context of a civil action
and concluded that a preponderance of the evidence standard seemed
appropriate; an erroneous verdict in favor of the plaintiff was no more
serious than an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor. However,
this reasoning does not apply if the social disutility of restricting free
speech is viewed as greater than the disutility of protecting obscene
speech.5 7
Because the danger and the resulting harm to society may be great
if protected expression is continually subjected to erroneous suppres-
sion,58 the Court should insure that the opportunity for error in the fac-
53. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
54. 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. Although In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), involved a juvenile delinquency
proceeding, Justice Harlan's reasoning seems applicable to a trial involving the issue of
obscenity.
56. In re Winship, id. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
57. This analogy is drawn from Harlan's discussion regarding the disparate disutility
of convicting an innocent man as opposed to freeing a guilty man in a criminal trial.
Id. at 372.
58. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 685-86 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tual determination of the obscenity of any material is minimized. This
bias in favor of free speech is the basic justification for requiring that
the higher standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) be an essen-
tial element of any obscenity trial, criminal or civil.
It may be contended that if the Constitution does require such a
standard of proof, then there would be little or no incentive to utilize
civil sanctions when criminal prosecutions, with equal procedural bur-
dens, are a greater deterrent to those who disseminate obscene ma-
terial. This logic, however, overlooks some important counterpoints.
First, it is only in those instances where the question of obscenity is
a relatively close one that the higher standard of proof may affect the
outcome of the litigation. Frequently, the trier of fact will be able to
conclude that it is more probable than not that the material is obscene,
but not that it is obscene beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, a civil proceeding need not frustrate a prosecutor's en-
forcement efforts. On the contrary, it may prove more beneficial to
the state by increasing the number of persons who will be deterred
from dealing in obscene material. Given the prosecutor's limited re-
sources of both time and money, an equitable action is efficient, as it
allows the joinder of multiple parties regardless of their alleged crim-
inal activity. On the other hand, if the prosecutor were to pursue a
similar course of action through criminal prosecutions, he would be re-
quired initially to establish to the satisfaction of the court the probable
cause to believe that a particular party engaged in prohibited conduct,
before he could proceed with an action to restrain the activities.
Finally, it is important to consider the basic distinctions between
civil and criminal litigation. Civil proceedings generally have been
characterized as remedial, 50 whereas criminal prosecutions are of
course punitive.60 Whenever the effects of a civil action begin to re-
semble criminal punishment, due process should mandate greater pro-
cedural protection. 61  Because the first amendment necessitates
greater awareness and protection for an individual's right to speak and
59. A civil action is remedial, because its primary purpose is the prevention of fu-
ture harm or compensation for an injured party. Its function is to protect a private
right. Pearson v. State, 159 Tex. 66, 315 S.W.2d 935, 937 (1958).
60. In the area of obscenity, they penalize the speaker for his ideas and also penal-
ize that segment of society who wishes to receive expression that the injunction pro-
hibits the speaker from disseminating.
61. Cf. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) (Involuntary civil
commitment to mental institution without legal counsel).
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to hear, the Court should conclude that a jury trial and the higher stan-
dard of proof on the question of obscenity are required in all cases.
IT. SUBSEQUENT USE OF A CIVIL ADJUDICATION
OF OBSCENITY
Once there has been a judicial determination that certain material
is obscene, it is important to consider the possible effects this will have
in subsequent proceedings. The Court in McKinney, held that a prior
judgment would not have preclusive effect against the defendant in a
subsequent criminal prosecution when the party did not have notice and
an opportunity to participate in the earlier civil action. The plurality
opinion however, did not resolve the issue of when or how the doctrine
of collateral estoppel was applicable to either a later proceeding involv-
ing a party present in the original action, or a subsequent action involv-
ing the same material, brought against an individual not included in
the prior civil adjudication. The question can arise in the three types
of actions which may follow a civil determination of obscenity: (1)
a contempt proceeding involving a party not joined in the prior civil
litigation; (2) a criminal prosecution of a defendant in the first action;
and (3) another civil adjudication or criminal prosecution including the
same material, but brought against an individual who did not participate
in the earlier trial. In this third category, the defendant may seek to
use the prior civil determination as collateral estoppel against the pro-
secuting party.
A. A CONTEMPT PROCEEDING INVOLVING A PARTY
NOT JOINED IN THE FiRCT ACTION
Legislation which authorizes civil proceedings usually provides
that in the event a judgment is entered declaring the matter to be ob-
scene, the court shall issue an order requiring the surrender and de-
struction of the material and issue a permanent injunction against any
person selling or distributing the obscene matter. 2 Conduct in viola-
tion of the court ordered injunction may constitute grounds for holding
one in civil or criminal contempt6 3 because an order issued by a court
62. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(10) (Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 272, § 30 (West Supp. 1977-1978); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 6330.6 (McKinney Supp.
1976-1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (3) (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §
1040.20 (Supp. 1976); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903(h) (Purdon 1973); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 2812(a) (Supp. 1977).
63. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947).
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with jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person must be obeyed
by the parties until it is reversed after proper review. 64
Contempt is characterized as criminal or civil depending on
whether the dominant purpose of the contempt proceeding is to punish
the alleged contemnor or coerce him to do something. 6 Criminal con-
tempt has as its primary purpose the preservation and maintainance of
the authority and dignity of the court, and the punishment of those
parties who disobey its orders.6 6 On the other hand, the essential func-
tion of civil contempt is remedial; it is a sanction to compensate an
injured party for losses or damages suffered because of noncompliance,
or to coerce obedience to a court order.6
In order to hold a person in contempt for violating a court ordered
injunction, two elements must be present.08 First, the alleged con-
temnor must have violated the court order with actual knowledge of
its existence and the terms it contained. 9 This requirement of actual
knowledge does not necessitate any finding that the party was formally
served with the order of the court.70  Second, the order which is said
to have been disobeyed must be specific and definite so as to give the
individual fair warning of the prohibited conduct or the duties imposed
upon him.71  The court will test the sufficiency of the order on the
basis of several criteria, which include: the circumstances surrounding
the entry of the court order, the remedy sought by the aggrieved party,
the evidence presented at the injunction proceeding, and the harm
which the injunction seeks to prevent. 72  Additionally, if the alleged
contemnor is prosecuted for criminal contempt, the court must conclude
that he intended to violate the order or that he willfully disobeyed its
command.73 This intent to do the act may also be present in a civil
contempt, but it is not a prerequisite. 74
Once the requisite elements are established, it becomes necessary
64. Id. at 293; Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967).
65. State v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223, 225 (1957).
66. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 458 (8th Cir. 1902).
67. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949).
68. In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1967).
69. Id.; see also, Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 640 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Spence v. The Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 100 S.E.2d 435, 439 (1957).
70. Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 640 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
71. In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1967).
72. United States v. Christie Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1972).
73. Duemling v. Fort Wayne Community Concerts, Inc., 243 Ind. 521, 188 N.E.2d
274, 276 (1963).
74. In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1967); Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp.
633 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Farber v. Rizzo, 363 F. Supp. 386, 395 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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to determine if the alleged contemnor is bound by the court order. A
party who participated in the proceeding in which the injunction was
issued would clearly be bound, but there is the problem of whether
a party who was not joined in the original litigation is also required to
comply with the terms of the order. Some states have statutorily de-
fined which parties were bound by a court ordered injunction against
the further dissemination of obscene material. Some of these statutes
provide that any person who receives written notice of the filing of the
complaint or judgment must obey the order.7 5 Other legislation binds
the respondent to the action and those persons who are in active con-
cert with the respondent, provided these persons have actual notice
of the injunction."'
Absent statutory provisions, courts have taken either an expansive
or restrictive position on the effect of an order on a person not joined
or given the opportunity to participate in the equity action. One juris-
diction has declared that although an individual was not a party to the
injunction proceeding, he may be punished for contempt if it is shown
that he had actual knowledge of the order and its provisions and never-
theless disobeyed it.71 On the other hand, it has been held that only
those nonparties who had actual knowledge of the order and its terms
and who are abetting a party to the action, or were legally identified
with him, could be held in contempt."'
If an individual is found in contempt, the court will decide his pun-
ishment depending on whether the purpose of the penalty is to punish
for past acts or to secure future compliance with the order.7 9 A finding
of criminal contempt may necessitate a fine or imprisonment for the
contemnor5 0 A verdict of civil contempt may result in a fine for dam-
ages to the aggrieved party or incarceration for the purpose of coercing
obedience to the order.8 With respect to the granting or withholding
of sanctions, a finding of contempt does not always result in a fine or
75. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(i) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (both elements
must be present); OK.A. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.22 (1971) (either element is a sufficient
prerequisite).
76. A. A. CODE tit. 14, § 374(11) (Supp. 1973).
77. Spence v. The Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, -, 100 S.E.2d 435, 439 (1957).
78. Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 640 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
79. United States v. United Mine Workes of America, 330 U.S. 258, 302 (1947).
80. Id. at 303.
81. Id. at 303-04 (1947); Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 643 (E.D. Pa.
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imprisonment,8 2 because the imposition of punishment is within the dis-
cretion of the judge." A trial judge, when exercising his discretion
on the question of what penalty is to be assessed, may consider several
factors: the extent of the contemnor's willful disobedience of the
court's order and the seriousness of the consequences which have fol-
lowed from noncompliance; the importance of preventing future con-
tumacious conduct by the defendant; and the necessity of protecting
the public's interest by putting an end to the contemnor's conduct. 84
If the previous analysis were applied to the factual setting of Mc-
Kinney, it is conceivable that the petitioner, as a nonparty, could have
been found in contempt of court for violating an order prohibiting the
further sale of certain materials although he could not have been con-
victed criminally without first being afforded notice and an opportunity
to litigate the issue of obscenity vel non. If the court had found him
in civil and/or criminal contempt, they could have imprisoned him for
past acts or incarcerated him until he complied with the court order
to surrender the obscene material for destruction, or fined him as pun-
ishment or as damages for the aggrieved party, here, the state.85
Justice Douglas, in a fiery dissent in Kingsley Books, warned of
the potential abuses that may result from the use of injunctions and
contempt citations in the free speech area.8 6 He argued that an injunc-
tion "substitutes punishment by contempt for punishment by jury trial.
. . . [and in that respect] it transgresses constitutional guarantees. '87
In light of this assertion, a court should exercise its power to hold an
individual in contempt with the "utmost sense of responsibility and cir-
82. Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
83. Id.
84. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947).
85. Id. at 303-04. See, e.g., OnrA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.22 (1971). This section
provides that if one violates a court ordered injunction against the further sale of ma-
terial judicially determined to be obscene, he is, "guilty of contempt of court and upon
conviction after notice and hearing shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not more
than one (1) year or fined not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or be
so imprisoned or [sic] fined."
An injured party must prove his actual damages by reason of the contemnor's vio-
lation of the injunction. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304
(1947); Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In the context
of a contempt proceeding involving a violation of an injunction against the further
dissemination of certain obscene material, a court may have difficulty imposing a civil
sanction in the form of a fine, because the state may not be able to demonstrate that
there have been tangible losses caused by the defendant's noncompliance.
86. 354 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 447.
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cumspection,"' when there has been a violation of a court ordered in-
junction. Along with the previously mentioned considerations, a court
might want to make several additional inquiries before finding a party
in contempt. First, it should determine the nature of the subject mat-
ter that is enjoined. The court should exercise greater leniency with
an inadvertent or inconsequential violation of its order when society
places high values on the preservation of the subject matter.8 9 Second,
the court should consider if the alleged contemnor was a party, or privy,
to the action in which the injunction was issued. A defendant who was
not joined and did not have an opportunity to participate in the prior
action, even though he had actual knowledge of the court order, may
have assessed the importance of his first amendment rights differently
from those who did participate in the proceeding. Therefore, they
might have conducted a more vigorous defense of their constitutional
rights.
It is arguable that such an approach may either lead to a total frus-
tration of the purpose of the injunction or encourage parties not joined
in the action to disregard court orders. This result will not occur if
courts continue to exercise their sound judgment. There may be in-
stances where a court is compelled to find a non-party in contempt,
but this action does not have to become a common practice. Courts
are instinctively aware of the due process requirement of fair play and
should not allow states to circumvent the constitutionally mandated pro-
cedures of notice and an opportunity to be heard through ancillary
means, such as injunctions and contempt proceedings.
B. A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION INVOLVING A
DEFENDANT IN THE FIRST ACTION
Many statutes provide that once a given publication has been ju-
dicially found to be obscene in a civil action, it is a crime, punishable
by a fine, imprisonment, or both, to disseminate such material.90 This
section considers the effect of a prior civil adjudication of obscenity in
the subsequent criminal prosecution of an individual who had notice
88. Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 640 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (quoting Glenwal
Development Corp. v. Schmidt, 356 F. Supp. 67, 69 (D.P.R. 1972)).
89. For example, if the subject matter of the injunction was speech, the court may
choose not to punish a contemnor if it feels that the original proceeding may be erron-
eously suppressed protected speech.
90. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(4) (Supp. 1973) (a misdemeanor); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 14:106G (West 1974) (a felony, if distributed to an unmarried person
under the age of seventeen); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 284, § 29 (West Supp.
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and an opportunity to litigate the question of obscenity in the prior civil
action.
In McKinney, the defendant was served with notice of the judg-
ment of a prior civil proceeding to which he was not a party. In the
civil litigation, the court had found certain named publications to be
obscene. Subsequent to serving the defendant with notice, the state
found one of those publications in the petitioner's bookstore. The state
indicted and convicted him for possession with the intent to distribute
judicially determined obscene material. The petitioner was not given
an opportunity to litigate the question of obscenity in his criminal
trial. The trial court ruled that the issue had been concluded in
the earlier equitable action and the defendant could not relitigate the is-
sue.9' The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the
case to allow the petitioner the opportunity to litigate, in some forum,
the question of obscenity.92 By neglecting to specify the nature of the
forum where the issue was to be litigated, the Court left unanswered
the question of what effect a civil determination of obscenity would
have in a subsequent action. In particular, they did not resolve the
issue of whether collateral estoppel could be used to estop a party from
relitigating an issue in a subsequent criminal prosecution 3 and whether
its use might raise equal protection and due process problems.
Collateral Estoppel
In deciding whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be in-
voked, this comment makes a two-step analysis: First, it examines the
prerequisites to applying the rule, and second, it considers the limita-
tions, if any, on allowing its use. In this analysis, this section explores
those aspects of collateral estoppel which may have a bearing on an
obscenity trial.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel requires that where a question
1977-1978) (a felony); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW § 6330.5 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977)
and N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.21 (McKinney Supp. 19764977) (a felony); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.2(h) (Supp. 1975) (a misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.13
(1971) (a misdemeanor); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802(a) (1974) (a misdemeanor).
91. McKinney v. Alabama, 292 Ala. 484, 296 So.2d 228 (1974), rev'd, 424 U.S.
669 (1976).
92. Id. See generally Hirsch & Ryan, I Know It When I Seize It: Selected Prob-
lems in Obscenity, 4 LoY. L.A.L. Rav. 9, 70-81 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hirsch &
Ryan] for a discussion of how and when the concept of collateral estoppel may be ap-
plicable to multiple criminal prosecutions concerning allegedly obscene material.
93. See McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976).
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of fact or law essential to the judgment is actually litigated and neces-
sarily decided in the first proceeding, the issue is conclusively settled
and may not be relitigated in a subsequent action between the same
parties or their privies.94 The primary justifications for the doctrine
are to prevent repetitious litigation, to discourage a party from shopping
for a receptive forum, and to decide conclusively the rights of adverse
parties and any disputed issues.9 5 If a party desires to take advantage
of collateral estoppel, he must show that all the elements required for
its application are present.96 Conversely, a party seeking to avoid es-
toppel must prove that either the doctrine is not applicable as the pre-
requisites have not been met or that there is a limitation on its use.97
In deciding how the rule of collateral estoppel may be applicable
in this context, it is important to understand the basic nature of an ob-
scenity trial. An obscenity trial is a procedural hybrid in that it con-
tains elements of in rem, in personam, and quasi in rem jurisdiction.
It is an action in rem because the proceeding is directed against specific
material and seeks a determination that such material is obscene. The
litigation has in personam aspects, because it is directed against certain
named individuals. Finally, because the action will determine the
rights of the parties with respect to the res, the allegedly obscene mat-
ter, it has the characteristics of a quasi in rem proceeding. It must be
noted, however, that the principal issue for estoppel purposes is the
question of whether the material is obscene. 98
Before a court precludes a party from relitigating an issue, it must
determine if the prerequisites to utilizing collateral estoppel are pre-
sent.9 9 This determination is based upon the answers to four ques-
tions: (1) was the issue being sought to be precluded raised and con-
sidered in the first action and necessarily decided? (2) was the nature
of the issue decided one of fact or law? (3) what are the natures of
the past and present adjudicating bodies, and was the first judgment
final and valid? (4) who were the parties and their privies to the first
94. See Green v. Chafee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775, 779-80 (1962).
95. See generally A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 7-12 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as VESTAL].
96. See Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 509-11 (E.
D. Mich. 1974).
97. Id.
98. See Hirsch & Ryan, supra note 92, at 76-77.
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suit and to the present one?100 Each of these questions shall be con-
sidered in the context of obscenity proceedings.
The most basic postulate of collateral estoppel is that the issue
must have been actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior
suit.'0 ' This connotes that the litigation involved adversary parties who
advanced their positions with both argument and evidence and which
resulted in the decision of an issue. Difficulty may arise where an issue
that was necessary to the resolution of the original suit was not actually
litigated by the parties, but resolved by other means. For example,
some courts have determined that if a party to the litigation had an op-
portunity to appear and protect his interests, a default judgment, like
any other judgment, is conclusive on any issue necessary to support the
judgment.102 Conversely, it has been held that a default judgment is
not conclusive, because the issue was not actually litigated.' 0 3 The rule
in a given jurisdiction as to whether the concept of collateral estoppel
is applicable following a default judgment may be important when
there is a subsequent criminal prosecution against a party who de-
faulted in the first action and who now wishes to contest the issue of
obscenity.
An approach has been suggested that would allow the court to
evaluate a party's failure to litigate before reaching a decision on the
question. The court may consider such factors as: the importance of
the matter to the conceding party; the cost of litigation; and the ease
with which a defense could have been made on the point. These fac-
tiors bear on the root question of whether a party had both the oppor-
100. Much of the discussion and examination of collateral estoppel in this section
is patterned after the format proffered by VESTAL, supra note 95.
There are three additional elements of collateral estoppel: (1) "the issue to be con-
cluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action;" (2)"the issue must have
been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action;" and (3)"the resolution
of that issue must have been essential to the judgment rendered." Overseas Motors, Inc.
v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 512 (E.D. Mich. 1974). Because the issue
of obscenity is essential to the court's determination in any trial involving allegedly ob-
scene material, these additional elements will not be further considered.
101. Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 512 (E.D. Mich.
1974).
102. Harvey v. Griffiths, 133 Cal. App. 17, 23 P.2d 532, 534 (1933); Lawhorn v.
Wellford, 179 Tenn. 625, 168 S.W.2d 790, 792 (1943).
103. Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (estoppel dependent
upon whether parties could reasonably foresee the conclusive effect of their actions);
Crowder v. Red Mountain Min. Co., 127 Ala. 254, 29 So. 847 (1900); See also IB
MooRE's FEDERA.L P CnTCE 0.44[2] (2d ed. 1974).
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tunity and the incentive to litigate the matter fully and whether it is
reasonable to hold the defaulting party estopped. 04
The second question which the court must evaluate is the nature
of the issue sought to be precluded. For preclusion to take place, the
issue must be the same as that decided in the prior action.105 Because
the original decision was based upon facts and conditions existing at
the time, collateral estoppel will not bar relitigation of an issue when,
after the prior judgment, events and conditions arise which create a
new legal setting or alter the rights of the parties. 10 6 Likewise, estop-
pel is not applicable if there has been a change in the applicable law
between the time of the first judgment and the present action.10 7
In an obscenity trial, the contention that there has been an inter-
vening change of fact or law since the original proceeding may be a
successful defense to the use of collateral estoppel. The Supreme
Court in Miller, ruled that one of the basic guidelines for the trier of
fact must be what the "average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find. 08 The issue of bbscenity then is one
of fact.10 9 Because contemporary "[clommunity standards are in-
herently in a state of flux""10 there is a substantial danger that material
which is judicially determined to be obscene may never be available
to the community, although it would no longer consider the material
to be patently offensive or appealing to the prurient interest. If a per-
son is charged with the crime of distributing material judicially deter-
mined to be obscene, that individual should be permitted to claim that
"contemporary community standards" have changed from the time of
the prior proceeding to the time when he committed the acts for which
he is charged. If this defendant can establish any basis for this claim,
he should not be barred from relitigating the issue of obscenity."'
One difficulty apparent with this proposal is how one shows that there
has been a significant change in community standards since the first
litigation. Possible solutions include the showing of a significant pas-
104. See VErAj, supra note 95, at 200 n.27.
105. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601-02 (1948).
1106. See Township of Washington v. Gould, 39 NJ. 527, 189 A.2d 697, 700-02
(1963).
107. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162 (1945).
108. 413 U.S. at 24.
109. See id. at 24-26.
110. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. at 689-90 (Brennan, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 690.
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sage of time or that recent trials involving similar material have resulted
in either acquittals or hung juries."'
In deciding whether it is reasonable to allow collateral estoppel,
some jurisdictions have examined the subject matter of the litigation
in light of the importance that society places on the issue. In par-
ticular, the court may be reluctant to permit collateral estoppel on con-
stitutional issues involving political and civil rights."13 When the issue
upon which preclusion is sought is one which merely affects the prop-
erty rights of the individual parties to the lawsuit, its importance is
limited to those parties. However, when that issue deals with basic
constitutional rights, or affects the availability of material to the public,
the interests of the private litigants are outweighed by the interests of
the individual and society and mandate a trial de novo on the issue."4
Because, "[t]he fundamental freedoms of speech and press have
contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free so-
ciety and are indispensable to its continued growth,""' ; a court should
exercise restraint in precluding a party when the question involved in
both suits is one of free speech or obscenity. In this context, the court
may choose to avoid the rule of collateral estoppel when a free speech
issue has been resolved adversely to the speaker. On the other hand,
the court may allow a prior determination of free speech to be conclu-
sive against a prosecutor in a subsequent action regarding the same
matter. The reason for treating these respective interests differently
is that society needs to provide greater support for the individual's right
to speak than it does for the censor's right to suppress.
The third facet of collateral estoppel involves a judicial inquiry
into the nature of the adjudicating bodies. In order for an issue to be
precluded, it must be established that the courts in both actions had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the persons. 10 If the court
in the first suit did not have jurisdiction, then its judgment would not
be conclusive in a later proceeding, although the same issue and parties
are involved. 17
112. See Lockhart, supra note 19, at 577 n.165.
113. Sweeny v. City of Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525, 530-31 (W.D. Ky. 1951), a/'d
per curiam sub nom. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.,
1953) vacated per curiain on other grounds, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
114. See VESTAL, supra note 95, at 271.
115. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957).
116. See Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
117. See generally VESTAL, supra note 95, at 257-68.
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A jurisdictional problem may be important in the context of a civil
adjudication of obscenity."1 If the courts in both actions are courts
of general jurisdiction within the same state, there generally will not
be a jurisdictional problem in barring a party from relitigation of the
issue.'1 9 However, a question of jurisdiction may arise where the court
in which the material was found to be obscene is of limited jurisdiction
and the court hearing the second proceeding is of general jurisdic-
tion.120  A party to the civil action may successfully urge that because
the first court exercised limited jurisdiction, its judgment should not be
binding on the present tribunal and, therefore, it should not estop a
relitigation of the issue.' 2'
In addition to an examination of the characteristics of the adjudi-
cating bodies, a court must decide if the order or ruling of the prior
court was final. The concept of collateral estoppel is not applicable
to a subsequent proceeding unless there has been a final judgment in
the original action.1 22  A decision may be final and preclusive, if an
appeal has been attempted but not perfected, if the ruling if unappeal-
able, or if an appeal has been heard and decided by the higher court. 123
A split exists among jurisdictions on the question of finality when an
appeal has been timely filed, but not yet heard and decided by the ap-
pellate court. It has been held that an appeal from a judgment does
not cause that judgment to be inoperative as collateral estoppel de-
tween the same parties, although the initial decision may be subse-
118. There may be a problem in applying collateral estoppel where a court has state-
wide jurisdiction, but the state has selected the local jurisdiction as the "contemporary
community" for purposes of determining community standards in obscenity trials. See
notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text. In essence, the collateral estoppel effect of
the judgment may be limited to the local judicial district.
119. A problem may arise if the court in the first instance is one of limited jurisdic-
tion and the state designates its "contemporary community" as the entire state. See
notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text. If a court of general jurisdiction allows the
decision of the inferior court to be collateral estoppel as to the issue of obscenity of
certain material, then the adjudication of the inferior court may establish the statewide
"contemporary community" standard. See generally Hirsch & Ryan supra note 92, at
76-81.
120. For example, an inferior court may be a municipal court, a probate court, or
justices' court. See VESTAL, supra note 95, at 215-17.
121. A litigant in the second action may avoid preclusion on a given issue, because
courts are not required to follow the decisions of inferior courts. People v. Scofield,
249 Cal. App. 727, 57 Cal. Rptr. 818, 822 (1957); accord, Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co.,
89 So.2d 28, 30 (Fla. 1956). Nonetheless, a court may choose to give estoppel effect
to the adjudication of an inferior court. See Vns'TAL, supra note 95, at 257 n.30.
122. Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89 (1954).
123. See generally VESTAL, supra note 95, at 233-38.
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quently reversed.124  Other courts hold to the contrary, and give no
estoppel effect to the prior ruling if the issue may be reversed on ap-
peal.125  The subsequent forum should carefully consider this factor,
before deciding that the issue is concluded by the first judgment.1 20
Finally, the court must ascertain whether the parties in the second
action were parties or their privies in the first litigation, because the
doctrine of collateral estoppel binds only those parties to the first judg-
ment and their privies.127  Additionally, an individual, who is not con-
sidered a party or privy to the initial proceeding, may be bound by that
judgment where his interests are of the same class as the interests of
those who were joined in the proceeding.128
In Hansberry v. Lee, 129 the Supreme Court recognized that it was
constitutionally permissible for states, in appropriate cases, to entertain
"class action" lawsuits which would be binding upon members of the
class who were not formal parties to the action. Such actions were
permitted, where the interests of the absent parties were adequately
represented by those present, where the interests of the parties joined
and those not present were identical, or where the parties present were
legally entitled to assert the interests of the absent individuals. 8 0 The
Court however, stated that a decision to bind non-parties to a judgment
would be scrutinized by the Court in light of the due process require-
ments of notice and an opportunity to be heard.''
124. See Reed v. Alien, 286 U.S. 191 (1932); Denham v. Shellman Grain Elevator,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1971); Overseas Motors Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375
F. Supp. 499, 517 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
125. See Chapman v. John St. John Drilling Co., 73 N.M. 261, 387 P.2d 462, 465
(1963); Sabine Pilots Ass'n v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Inc., 346 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Civ.
App. Tex. 1961).
126. See REsTATEm:ENT (SEcoNv) oF JUDGmmNS § 41, Reporter's Notes, comment
f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
127. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942); Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 262 (Super. Ct. Del. 1934). A
party has been defined as: "one who is directly interested in the subject matter, and
had a right to make a defense, or to control the - proceeding, and to appeal from the
judgment." Bernard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. -, 122 P.2d
892, 894 (1942). A party is in privity if he is: "one who, after rendition of the judg-
ment, has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through
or under one of the parties, as by inheritence, succession, or purchase." Id.
128. See notes 129 & 130 infra and accompanying text.
129. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
130. Id. at 42.
131. Id. at 40. One of the prerequisites to maintaining a class action is that the per-
sons constituting the class must be so numerous as to make it impractical to join all
of them in the litigation. See C. WRIGHT, LAw oF FEDERAL CouRTs 346 (3d ed. 1976).
See generally Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HA-v. L. REv. 1318 (1976).
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In applying the Court's ruling in Hansberry in the context of an
obscenity trial, the question arises as to whether the state can consider
all dealers of certain materials to be within a class and seek to bind
them all by a civil judgment in an action involving several members
of the class. The Court's opinion in McKinney appears to resolve this
issue in the negative. There, the Court rejected the contention that
the existence of certain named parties provided sufficient adversity in
the civil proceedings to permit the state to use the adjudication as col-
lateral estoppel against a party not joined. Rather, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the interests of the named parties were not "sufficiently
identical to those of the petitioner that they would adequately protect
his First Amendment rights."' 32  Furthermore, he found no evidence
that the petitioner was in privity with the named parties.
Once a court is satisfied that the prerequisites for allowing col-
lateral estoppel exist, it must still decide if there are any limitations
on its application. Some states, by statute, have limited the effects of
collateral estoppel to a judicial district.13   There may also be state con-
stitutional limitations on the use of the doctrine.' Due process may
be violated when a prior judgment, which was grossly incorrect, is con-
clusive as to an issue in a subsequent action between the same par-
ties.135 Furthermore, the very use of a civil determination to bar re-
litigation of an element of a criminal prosecution may raise due process
problems.
In In re Winship, the Court held that, "the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged."'3 " Subsequently, in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 37 the Court,
in an unanimous opinion, extended the ruling of Winship and found
that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every ele-
ment which constitutes the crime charged against the defendant.138  In
132. 424 U.S. at 675.
133. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14: 106F(4) (West 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
190.2(f) (Supp. 1975).
134. This comment deals with federal constitutional problems and does not consider
whether there may be limitations imposed on the use of collateral estoppel by state con-
stitutions or statutes.
135. See Wayside Transp. Co. v. Marcel's Motor Express, Inc., 284 F.2d 868, 871
(1st Cir. 1960). See also VESTAL, supra note 95, at 446-54, for an examination of other
due process problems arising in the collateral estoppel context
136. 397 U.S. at 364.
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light of due process requirements, a judgment in a civil case is not con-
clusive as to an issue in a criminal case, because there is a higher stan-
dard of proof in a criminal case.'39 If a civil judgment were allowed to
bar relitigation of an issue in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the
practical effect would be to nullify the rule of Mullaney. 40
Because due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
each and every element of a crime, how an element is defined is of
critical importance. Typically, statutes provide that every person who:
(1) with knowledge of its contents; (2) sells, distributes, or possesses
with the intent to sell or distribute; (3) any matter known by such per-
son to have been judicially found to be obscene (in a civil action) shall
be guilty of a crime.' 4 ' Thus, an essential element of the crime is that
the material has been judicially determined to be obscene. One pos-
sible interpretation of this element is that the prosecution need only
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there has been a judicial pro-
ceeding wherein the court found the material to be obscene. The state
would not be required to relitigate the actual question of obscenity, un-
less the criminal defendant had not had an opportunity to contest the
issue of obscenity in the prior action. 41
The danger of such a result is illustrated by the fact that the Su-
preme Court has not established a standard of proof for civil obscenity
cases. Therefore, it may be permissible for a trial court to admit evi-
dence of a civil action and its determination that the material is ob-
scene, because such evidence bears not on the issue of whether the
material is obscene, but rather on the question of whether there was
a judicial determination of obscenity. In essence, the defendant is pre-
cluded from relitigating the issue of obscenity because it is not a re-
quisite element of the crime with which the defendant is charged,
which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The inequities of allowing a civil judgment, under a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, to be conclusive on the issue of obscen-
ity in a criminal action are clear. The Court in Mullaney recognized
that if the courts looked only at the formal wording of a criminal stat-
139. See Roden & Son v. State, 30 Ala. App. 229, 3 So. 2d 420, 421 (Ct. App. 1941);
State v. Well, 83 S.C. 478, 65 S.E. 634, 635 (1909).
140. See State v. Weil, 83 S.C. 478, 65 S.E. 634 (1909).
141. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 374(4) (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
190.2(h) (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.13 (1971).
142. See McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976). See generally Hirsch &
Ryan, supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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ute, rather than the operation and effect of the law as applied and en-
forced by the state, a state could undermine many of the interests that
due process sought to protect, by merely redefining the elements that
constitute different crimes."' It has also been stated that, "[t]he re-
quirement that obscenity be proved beyond a reasonable doubt may
not be diluted by transporting the determination to a prior civil proceed-
ing, for the essence of the crime in reality remains the sale of obscene
literature rather than disobedience of a court injunction."'144 However,
it would still appear to be consistent with due process to allow a deci-
sion from a prior civil action to be conclusive on an element of a
criminal prosecution when the standards of proof are identical.
The general principle that a determination in a civil case is not
binding in a criminal prosecution may not be an absolute. In Yates
v. United States141 the Supreme Court, in dicta, suggested that there
may be an exception to this rule. In that criminal case, the defendant
contended that the rule of collateral estoppel should be applied against
the government. The government, in a prior civil action, had been un-
successful in establishing the fact under a preponderance standard, and
the defendant argued that they should not be allowed another opportun-
ity to prove the same fact, particularly in light of the higher standard
of proof required in the criminal case. The Court rejected the defend-
ant's claim because the issue in the current criminal prosecution was
different from the issue involved in the prior civil proceeding. But,
before reaching its decision, the opinion noted that the judgment of a
civil proceeding was not made inapplicable by the fact that the subse-
quent action was a criminal one. Thus, a litigant who was unsuccessful
in establishing a fact in the original action may be barred from attempt-
ing to prove the same fact in a second proceeding. 4 6
If this reasoning is employed in an obscenity case, a court might
conclude that where a prosecutor has been unsuccessful in proving the
obscenity of certain material in a prior civil litigation, under the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard, he is precluded under the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel from having another opportunity to prove
it in the subsequent criminal proceeding. On the other hand, it does
not follow that a defendant is estopped because he did not have the
143. 421 U.S. at 698-99.
144. 424 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
145. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
146. Id. at 335-36.
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burden of proving that the material is obscene in the first instance. 47
In conclusion, if the court determines that an issue was actually
litigated and necessarily decided by a court of competent jurisdiction
in a prior action involving the same parties, it may consider permitting
the use of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of that issue, subject
to any limitations heretofore discussed. Still, a court should exercise
discretion in using the doctrine when there is a constitutional issue
involved or when there may be other constitutional problems. 48 In
that instance, the court should balance the policy of collateral estop-
pel against the constitutional interests at stake.
Equal Protection and Due Process
The use of collateral estoppel in a criminal prosecution also raises
equal protection and due process issues. 14 9 Equal protection mandates
that those who are similarly situated be treated equally under the
law. 0 In order to facilitate an analysis of these equal protection and
due process problems, assume this hypothetical: Two defendants are
being criminally prosecuted for the sale of certain obscene material.
Defendant A was involved in an earlier civil proceeding wherein the
issue of obscenity was, under a preponderance standard, decided in
favor of the state. He is being precluded from having the issue re-
litigated in the subsequent criminal action. Defendant B was not a
party to the civil determination and he is being initially prosecuted in
his criminal action. It must be fairly assumed that these parties are
similarly situated, as in both cases the substantive evil which the
state wishes to control is the sale of obscene material. Defendant A
is convicted of selling obscene material in the criminal action. Defend-
ant B, on the other hand, is acquitted in his criminal prosecution be-
cause the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the same
material was obscene. In essence, defendant A is denied equal pro-
tection and due process because the state did not comply with the re-
quirements of Mullaney.
Alternatively, suppose that defendant A has the question of ob-
scenity determined by a judge in the first action and is convicted by
147. See notes 33 & 34 supra and accompanying text.
148. For example, if the subject matter of the prior litigation involved a dispute about
whether certain speech was entitled to constitutional protections.
149. See generally McKinney v. Alabama, 292 Ala. 484, 296 So, 2d 228, 231-35
(1974) (Heflin, C.J., dissenting), rev'd 424 U.S. 669 (1976).
150. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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a jury in the criminal proceeding. Furthermore, suppose that defend-
ant B is acquitted by the jury in his criminal trial. In this instance,
defendant A is denied equal protection and the due process right to
a trial by jury on each element of the crime with which he is charged.' 51
Finally, assume that a state requires a unanimous jury verdict in
all criminal prosecutions, but allows nonunanimous jury determinations
in civil proceedings. If, in the prior civil action, the determination of
obscenity was based upon a nonunanimous verdict, and the issue of ob-
scenity is not relitigated in the criminal suit, A may still be convicted.
However, with defendant B, indicted for distributing the same ma-
terial, the jury can not reach a unanimous decision that the material
is obscene and the result is a mistrial. If a state mandates that there
shall be a unanimous jury verdict in all criminal cases, 152 equal protec-
tion and due process require that the jury consider all of the elements
of the crime with which defendant A is charged, including the issue
of obscenity, before rendering their verdict.
C. A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING INVOLVING A PARTY
WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE
PRIOR LITIGATION
In McKinney, the Supreme Court held that a state may not use
a prior judgment to estop a defendant, not a party to the earlier action,
from relitigating the issue of obscenity.153  The Court, however, did
not speculate as to what its holding would be if the factual situation
was reversed. Hypothetically, if the state is unable to prove that cer-
tain material is obscene in a prior equitable action, can a defendant,
who was a stranger to the first proceeding, avail himself of the judg-
ment in a later action and claim that the state is collaterally estopped
from relitigating the issue? The answer to this question initially in-
volves a study of which parties may use a prior judgment as collateral
estoppel.
In later litigation, the benefit of collateral estoppel is generally
available to both parties and their privies of the original action under
151. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
152. In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment guarantee of a jury trial, made applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, does not require that the jury verdict be
unanimous to convict the defendant of the crime charged.
153. 424 U.S. at 670-77.
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the mutuality rule.154 This rule states that the party taking advantage
of the earlier adjudication must have been bound by it, had the decision
gone against him.155 Traditionally, a stranger to the prior proceeding,
not being bound by its judgment, can not benefit from a prior deter-
mination by contending that it was binding as to a party who par-
ticipated in the earlier action.' 5 6
The mutuality rule, however, has been the subject of increasing
controversy in recent years among the jurisdictions.IG7  Some courts
have abandoned the requirement of "mutuality" and have allowed a
stranger to invoke the rule of collateral estoppel defensively against a
party to the original action.'18  It has been held consistent with public
policy to bind a plaintiff to a prior adverse judgment when he selects
the forum and there fails to establish his contentions.'5 " Likewise, the
use of a prior adjudication by a stranger has been declared not violative
of due process, as long as the party against whom the prior determina-
tion is used had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue
in the earlier litigation. 60
Applying the reasoning of Yates,'0 ' if a prosecutor has failed to
persuade the trier of fact that certain material is obscene in a prior
action, the court may permit a defendant, even though not a party
to the original litigation, to claim that the state is precluded from reliti-
gating the issue of obscenity. 6 Such a result may be harsh in some
instances, but the policy interests in resolving conflicts may outweigh
the interests of the prosecutor who after all, has directed the sequence
of litigation.
Allowing a prior judgment to be conclusive on the issue of ob-
scenity in a subsequent proceeding may have positive and negative im-
plications for both sides. For the prosecutor as well as the defendant,
collateral estoppel may be a vehicle for conclusively deciding the issue
154. See Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'1 Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942).
155. See id.; Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 261-62 (Super. Ct. Del.
1934).:
156. Id.
157. See Hirsch & Ryan, supra note 92, at 72 n.347.
158. Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 262-63 (Super. Ct. Del. 1934);
Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 807, 122 P.2d 892, 894-
95 (1942); Richmond v. Davis, 135 Va. 319, 116 S.E. 492, 493-94 (1923).
159. See Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 263 (Super. Ct. Del. 1934).
160. See Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967).
161. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 335-36 (1957).
162. See Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967).
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of obscenity as to certain materials for purposes of any future confronta-
tions.16 However, if the state is unsuccessful in establishing that the
material is obscene, the adjudication may be used defensively against
it by a stranger to the original proceeding. 164  The threat of estop-
pel in a subsequent criminal prosecution may also coerce a defendant,
who would not do so otherwise, to litigate the issue of obscenity in the
original action.1 65 Sound judicial discretion would dictate that the
courts balance the policy in favor of collateral estoppel against the
interests of individual litigants and the interests of free speech and
due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
A profound commitment to the preservation of free speech and
due process need not conflict with, or lead to a total frustration of, state
efforts to control the spread of obscenity. Rather, what is called for
are greater procedural safeguards, 16 6 in civil adjudications of obscenity,
to insure that, collectively, the interests of all parties are satisfied to
the optimum. The judgment of a prior civil trial directed under these
procedural standards would be entitled to estoppel effect in a subse-
quent action, be it in a civil or criminal forum, while avoiding any denial
of equal protection or due process.
G. Booker Schmidt
163. This proposition assumes that the civil adjudication involves a jury trial and the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.
164. See Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 299, 304 (D. Md. 1967).
165. If he defaulted in his appearance or pleading, the court in the second action may
allow the state to claim a bar to the relitigation of the obscenity of the material. See
VESTAL, supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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